TMA-A002 Foundational article
No autonomous lethal selection of human beings
The intentional decision to select a human being for lethal force must not be delegated to an autonomous system.
Full provision
Principle. The intentional decision to select a human being for lethal force must not be delegated to an autonomous system.
Proposed duty. No conforming system may independently select, rank, designate, track, prioritize, or engage a human target for intentional lethal force. This duty applies across the complete kill chain and cannot be evaded by dividing target identification, eligibility scoring, route planning, engagement timing, and weapon activation among separate systems.
Prohibitions. A conforming system must not:
- create or apply a generalized human target profile for lethal engagement;
- choose which identified person should be killed based on confidence scores, predicted intent, group membership, location, behavior, or data fusion;
- convert a list of people into a machine-selected lethal priority order;
- continue an engagement when human identity, status, location, or surrender cannot be reliably determined;
- hide autonomous target selection behind terms such as defense automation, perimeter security, threat neutralization, or operator-assist;
- allow an ordinary operator or secret administrator mode to bypass the prohibition.
Required safeguards. Any command reasonably understood to seek autonomous lethal selection must produce REFUSE, preserve a protected audit event, and escalate through a lawful human chain. Systems involved in sensing, classification, recommendation, navigation, or engagement must be reviewed together as one system-of-systems.
Nonhuman hazard boundary. A tightly bounded system may intercept a verified nonhuman projectile, unmanned hazard, or mechanically defined threat to protect people when its target class excludes humans, its operating area and duration are constrained, and its error modes receive independent review. Nothing in this boundary authorizes autonomous intentional selection of a human target.
Legal neutrality on force. The Accord does not determine when human use of force is lawful under domestic or international law. It establishes a narrower minimum: a system must not make the material human-target selection decision.
Illustrative examples. A defensive system may intercept an incoming rocket under a constrained nonhuman-object profile. An armed drone may not decide which person in a crowd matches a lethal target profile. A human pressing a final button does not create meaningful control if models have already made every material targeting decision and the person cannot understand or reject the recommendation.
Source: Complete Working Public Draft v0.2 · 2026-09-04
Sources and changes
Source text: The Mutuality Accord Complete Working Public Draft v0.2, September 4, 2026, Article 2. Preserved exactly as published in the draft.
Read it in the complete v0.2 draft ↗
Review owner: Founding Steward (independent review not yet established)
Review trigger: Open for revision; new evidence, incidents, legal changes, or credible reports of unintended harm reopen review.