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← The Mutuality Accord

TMA-A008 Foundational article

Meaningful human authorization and judgment

A human-in-the-loop label is meaningless when the human is uninformed, rushed, unqualified, coerced, unable to understand the system, or unable to stop the action.

Existing v0.2 draftResponsibility and safe refusalArticle 8 · Chapter B — Responsibility, Authorization, and Safe RefusalRevision 1

Full provision

Principle. A human-in-the-loop label is meaningless when the human is uninformed, rushed, unqualified, coerced, unable to understand the system, or unable to stop the action.

Proposed duty. High-consequence action requires meaningful human authorization unless a narrowly defined emergency-aid pathway applies. The human must have legitimate authority, relevant competence, adequate information and time, and practical control over the decision.

Minimum conditions. Authorization should be:

  • informed: the person understands the system’s role, uncertainty, expected consequences, and material alternatives;
  • specific: approval concerns the actual action, subject, purpose, duration, and operating conditions;
  • timely: approval is close enough to the action that circumstances have not materially changed;
  • attributable: the authorizer is identifiable and the decision is recorded;
  • competent: the authorizer has the training, role, and information required for the decision;
  • independent: the person is not forced by interface design, performance targets, or institutional pressure to accept the recommendation;
  • effective: the person can modify, delay, refuse, or stop the action;
  • revocable where feasible: continuing authorization can be withdrawn when circumstances change.

Prohibitions. A conforming system must not rely on:

  • a generic terms-of-service acceptance as authorization for a specific consequential action;
  • unreadable warnings, dark patterns, or approval interfaces designed to produce automatic assent;
  • a human operator monitoring more systems or decisions than can be meaningfully reviewed;
  • countdown pressure created solely to make refusal impractical;
  • post hoc approval of an action already irreversibly taken;
  • standing permission so broad that the human no longer selects the material decision.

Highest-risk actions. C4 actions should require separation of duties, independent confirmation, and a recorded basis. No authorization structure can make autonomous lethal human selection conforming.

Automation bias. Training and interface design must prepare human reviewers to disagree with the system. Review performance should measure careful judgment, not agreement rate.

Illustrative examples. A clinician meaningfully authorizes a treatment recommendation after reviewing the patient’s condition, alternatives, and uncertainty. A low-paid moderator clicking “approve” every two seconds cannot be represented as meaningful oversight of irreversible decisions. A dispatcher may pre-authorize a rescue robot to move incapacitated people from a flood zone within defined limits, with later review.

Source: Complete Working Public Draft v0.2 · 2026-09-04

Sources and changes

Source text: The Mutuality Accord Complete Working Public Draft v0.2, September 4, 2026, Article 8. Preserved exactly as published in the draft.

Read it in the complete v0.2 draft ↗

Review owner: Founding Steward (independent review not yet established)
Review trigger: Open for revision; new evidence, incidents, legal changes, or credible reports of unintended harm reopen review.

Stable references: cite “TMA-A008, revision 1”. Links to the latest version and links to a fixed revision are kept distinct.

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